In order to obtain an accurate view of the relations of the hypnotic to the normal condition, it is necessary to have a clear conception of the nature of nervous action, of the structure and function of the nervous system, ,of the interdependence which exists between the various organs of the body and the central nervous mechanism, and of the character of this interdependence. Many writers have given clear accounts of the nervous mechanism of the body; the distribution of the nerves has been described with an accuracy and detail, leaving nothing to be desired; but while one has concerned himself with the structure and another with the function, the Meeting-place of the two seems to have been in some respects singularly neglected. The general conception of the nature and extent of nervous action is thus faltering and inadequate; our terms are vague, mean too little or too much, and are too often used with but a faint glimpse of their meaning. A general consideration of nervous anatomy would here be impossible, and in tracing the outlines of the distribution of the system in man, we shall do no more than is absolutely necessary for the purpose of the argument we wish to establish and for an indication of the paths by which a psychical stimulus becomes ‘translated into a physical fact.
The human nervous system has a wide extension throughout the body, its ramifications blending with almost every structure; from anatomical and physiological points of view it is divided into distinct parts. The brain; including the cerebrum, cerebellum, pons Varolli, and medulla oblongata; the spinal cord with the peripheral nerves, and the ganglionic or sympathetic visceral chain. To the cerebrum belongs the functions of intellect, will, emotion, and, in fact, of all the great psychical processes; possessing these functions it necessarily has the control of the voluntary movements of the body, and coming to it, for its information, from the whole of the periphery are the varied stimuli derived from the outside world by the special senses of sight, hearing, touch, smell, and taste. Thus we have at once a marked differentiation of the functions of the brain into two sorts-(1) the psychical and (2) that connected with the issuing and receiving of impulses, and accordingly we find corresponding anatomical distinction. If we take a section through a hemisphere of the cerebrum, we find the central portion hard, comparatively resistant to the knife, dense in texture, and of a whitish appearance; external to this is a convoluted margin, composed of a darker substance, soft to the touch, more easily friable than the white matter, and dipping with some irregularity into the white layer beneath it. The central white matter consists of the nerve fibres coming from and going to the grey matter, and the difference of texture in this substance is due to the sheaths (the medullary sheath) in which the fibres are enclosed; the darker substance (the grey matter) is chiefly characterised by the presence of large numbers of nervous cells, together with a certain proportion of medullated and non-medullated nerve fibres.
The fundamental component of the cerebrum is the combination of a multitude of neurons, the total number of which has been estimated at about two thousand million. Each neuron is composed of a cell body, protoplasmic processes (dendrons), and the “axis-cylinder “process. The protoplasm of each neuron is distinct from that of every other, the only connection obtainable being by virtue of the proximity or contact of the dendrons. It is by means of these protoplasmic dendrons, which are a constituent of the neuron itself, that the impulses are finally conducted to the neuron, whilst the efferent impulses leave the neuron by the axis-cylinder process.
This process leaving the neuron gives off at intervals collateral branches which run at right angles to the process. The collaterals split up into the finest fibres which, with the dendrons of another neuron, form arborization. The neurons and the dendrons constitute, as has been said, the grey matter of the brain, whilst the axis-cylinder processes are chiefly found in the white matter. The nerves must pass through various structures before reaching their termination; the impulses to the periphery pass down. wards through the medulla oblongata to the spinal cord. And here there is a change in the relations of the grey to the white matter. Taking a cross section of the spinal cord, which, however, varies somewhat according to the level at which the section is taken, we find the grey internal to the white matter; the white consisting as before of nerve fibres; and the grey of neurons intermingled with nerve-fibres about to form arborescence around other neurons. Taking one-half of the section, we find the grey matter forms an anterior prominence, very definitely marked and termed the anterior cornu, whilst the posterior portion, more tapering and somewhat less definite in character, is termed the posterior cornu. The afferent nerve-fibres (i.e., the nerves going to the central nervous system from the periphery) enter the posterior cornu, and leaving the anterior cornu are the fibres conveying motor impulses to the periphery. These nerves leaving or entering the cord form two separate bundles known as the anterior and posterior nerve-roots, the posterior root bearing on it a ganglionic enlargement;, the two roots then become united into one large nerve trunk, containing both afferent and efferent fibres. The nerve fibres do not enter or leave the cord at the level at which their fibres enter or leave the grey matter, and thus there is outside the grey ‘matter of the cord the white matter consisting of medullated nerve-fibres.
We may now be able to trace the course of a motor impulse starting from the cerebral cortex. Starting from a neuron, it passes down the axis-cylinder process; this process now crosses to the opposite side of the cord, and at a certain level passes into the grey matter, where it breaks up into an arborescence round the dendrons of a neuron: from this neuron -an axis-cylinder is produced, which passes down a nerve-trunk, and finally breaks up in the muscle which it supplies. It is thus easy to perceive the elaboration of the mechanism involved in a single movement. As we have seen, the distal axis-cylinder gives out collateral branches which arborise with other neurons, whilst the termination of the first axis-cylinder is not in a muscle, but in a second neuron similarly surrounded with arborescing fibres; and from this neuron the second axis-cylinder proceeds, giving out before leaving the cord other collateral branches. We are able, therefore, to see that for the simplest movement the combination of many neurons is necessary, and a specific movement is brough tabout by the specific combination of these neurons, the activity of which is requisite for the performance of the movement. The course and distribution of the sensory nerves need not here be described, since, though differing in detail, the principles underlying their structure and course are essentially the same. For the same reason we have not discussed the course of the cranial nerves; there is, however, one special branch of the nervous system which plays so important a part in the adjustment of the organs to the immediate requirements of the organism that a short description may be useful. The “sympathetic” or “ganglionic” part of the nervous systems consists of (1) a series of ganglia connected together by intervening -cords, extending from the base of the scull to the coccyx, one on each side Of the middle line of the body, partly in front and partly on each side of the vertebral column; (2) of three great gangliated plexuses or aggregations of nerves and ganglia, situated in front of the spine in the thoracic, abdominal, and pelvic cavities respectively; (3) of smaller ganglia situated in relation with the abdominal viscera; and (4) of numerous nerve-fibres. These latter are of two kinds- communicating, by which the ganglia communicate with each other and with the cerebrospinal nerves; and distributory, supplying, in general, all the internal viscera and the coats of the blood-vessels. By means of this distribution every organ and gland in the body is governed and regulated. The distribution and course of the ganglionic system is elaborate and complex, and for an adequate description of the anatomy of the nervous system the reader is referred to the anatomical works (Quain, Gray, etc.). On anatomical grounds, therefore, we have every reason to assign to the nervous system functions much higher than those involving the mere conduction and dissemination of impulses; from the specific combinations of neurons already referred to, from the presence of multitudinous ganglia, and from the elaboration of the system, we have evidence of a mechanism which is selective, purposive, and adaptive in its functions.
We may now consider the method of action as regards the organic functions, since, without a knowledge of the nature of these processes, we shall not be able to realise the nature of the changes induced as a result of hypnotic suggestion.
To consider the nervous mechanism of each organ in detail would be an unnecessary labour, and we, therefore, may select a few examples, from which a clear idea may be gained of the general characters of the methods by which each part of the body is regulated to meet the demands made on it. Selecting; then, the heart as the most important organ, we may briefly discuss the paths of innervation and control as demonstrated by experiment on various animals. The heart is constantly regulated to the organic needs mainly through two channels; the sympathetic system conveying to it the accelerating or augmenting impulses, whilst the inhibition of the heart is maintained by the nervous impulses passing down the vagus nerve. At first sight such a double mechanism as this might appear unnecessary; it would seem simpler for the heart to have been provided with merely au augmenting mechanism, which should serve for the occasion when undue exertion on the part of the heart was called for; but it is, in fact, the inhibitory apparatus which plays the more important part, and which, throughout the body, has the more powerful and striking influence. Thus, under normal circumstances, the heart is working at only a comparatively small percentage of its real power, being restrained by the constant inhibitory impulses reaching it through the vagus, so that on some further effort of the heart being required, this is not provided for so much by an exhausting series of augmenting stimuli, which would correspond in some degree to the flogging of a wearying horse, but by the adjustive withdrawal of inhibitory influences; thus permitting the heart to respond to the calls made upon it without undue strain. We shall find that this action of inhibition has a profound influence on all the functions, from the most physical to the most psychical; and as the etiology of hypnosis largely depends on the alteration in the nervous balance of inhibitory impulses, we must refer to certain experiments in this direction.
If the vagus nerve in a frog be stimulated by means of an interrupted current, the normal beating of the heart will be interrupted, the heart ceases to contract, and the heart-muscle is completely relaxed; on the withdrawal of the stimulus the heart begins to contract, at first feebly, but in a short period with greater strength than before the stimulation; and this experiment may be repeated many times with precisely the same result. We here have a clear demonstration of the nature of impulses passing down the vagus to the heart: they are not impulses of a motor or innervating character, but perform the function of a regulatory inhibition.
Two experiments may be quoted as indicative of the nervous control of the whole of the vasomotor system, and of the process of secretion. The regulation of the blood supply to a part, and consequent, to a great extent, of the activity of that part is maintained by a compensatory mechanism similar to that of the heart. If, in a rabbit, the cervical sympathetic be divided, the vessels on-that side of the head dilate, the whole of the region affected becomes engorged with blood, and the temperature is raised. On stimulation of the central end of the divided nerve, the dilated vessels contract, the engorgement disappears, and the temperature returns to normal; the sympathetic system is thus seen to exert a constrictive action on the blood-vessels, thus maintaining a tonus and, consequently, an adequate blood-pressure. The most convincing experiments have, however, been performed upon the submandibular gland of the dog. As represented in the diagram (here omitted) the nervous supply of this gland is derived from two channels-the chorda tympani and the sympathetic. If the chorda tympani be divided, on stimulation of the peripheral end, a copious secretion from the gland ensues. The copious secretion thus obtained from the duct is clear and liquid. Simultaneously with the increased secretion the gland itself becomes hyperaemic, the blood-vessels dilate, and the blood-flow is more rapid; thus the chorda tympani contains fibres from a vaso-dilatator neuronic group, and other fibres from a secreto-motor group. On the other hand, when the cervical sympathetic is stimulated the arteries are constricted, the escape of blood from the veins is small, whilst the secretion of the gland is scantier and altered in character, being much more viscid and more albuminous. The sympathetic thus contains fibres from a vaso-constrictor group, and other fibres from a secreto-motor group. If the chorda tympani and the sympathetic be stimulated together, then the alteration and the secretion partake of both characters, the secretion being fairly copious in amount and viscid in character. With the above as a rapid survey of the nature of the proximal mechanism, we may now proceed to a discussion of the higher mechanism involved in the origination or interpretation of stimuli-of the relations between the psychical and the physical.
For a fuller and more adequate discussion of the subject the reader is referred to Foster’s “Text-Book of Physiology.”
Let us at once explain that by the term “psychical” we do not desire to endorse any of the various ideas connected with the word “soul “; we use the word simply to represent the non-physical aspects of nervous action. The various ideas connected with the “mind” and the “soul” are very confusing; but even as an hypothesis the doctrine of the soul would lend us no assistance, but would only needlessly involve an already complex question. We shall then regard the mind as one of the functions of a certain part of the nervous system, and, indeed, it will become evident in the course of discussion how impossible it must be to essentially separate the psychical processes from the physical. Yet in endeavouring to place before the reader a systematic view of the relations of the various forms of nervous activity, we shall have reason to differ from the teaching of the accepted schools of physiological psychology, and it is only just to the reader to say that though the theories here advanced have not been put forward without consideration, they fail to harmonise with the conclusions of many of the leading authorities in material respects.
The various kinds of nervous action may all be classed under three heads
1. Acts, constant, unmodified by reason of special adaptation to altered environment. Inaptic. [sic]
2. Acts, accompanied by adaptation to altered environment; purposive; unassociated with a conscious process. Aptic. [sic]
3. Acts, associated with a conscious process.
The student of physiological psychology regarding this classification from the accepted standpoint will at once notice that the differential elements vary from those usually put forward as the criteria of classification, and, moreover, he will hardly be prepared to sanction the disappearance of the one term more relied upon than any other, viz., the term “reflex.” Our reasons for this alteration will appear in the course of the argument.
The first class of nervous actions may be represented by the action which follows irritation of the cornea-; the eyelid immediately closes; the action is altogether independent of consciousness; volition has no power to prevent it; it is a definite muscular response to a definite stimulus; so long as the nervous mechanism is intact it will occur, entirely independent of and beyond the control of the individual. The second class includes actions which are more complicated and are adaptive. Moreover, an essential feature in this class is the presence of more or less elemental psychical action. Inasmuch, however, as the possibility of psychical action without consciousness is energetically denied by many authorities, we shall reserve the description and discussion of this special elimination till later. The third class comprises all those actions of which a conscious process is an essential feature. We have avoided the term “reflex” action; not indeed, that we are unwilling to use it when properly applied, but for the reason that reflex actions do not belong exclusively to the class of inaptic actions, but to all three classes, and to none more so than the class comprising the acts of consciousness. The most important point of our discussion will necessarily turn upon the fundamental distinction existing, in the writer’s opinion, between the inaptic and aptic classes of action, and inasmuch as this distinction is not generally admitted, we must refer to experiments illustrating this differentiation. If we destroy the brain of a frog as far down as the medulla oblongata, leaving the animal otherwise intact, we shall have an animal in whom all the nervous reaction to be obtained by experiment must necessarily take place in that portion of the nervous system not destroyed, i.e., the spinal cord and the peripheral nervous system in connection with it. With the animal in this condition we can readily obtain the class of actions called “reflex.” If the tip of any toe of the right foot be pinched, the right leg is immediately drawn up; if a toe of the opposite foot be pinched, then the opposite leg is drawn up. Now this is a constant simple reaction to stimulus; it is a physical property of the nervous mechanism existent in the spinal cord; the nervous system takes no cognisance of its adaptation to the circumstances; so long as the same stimulus be applied, so long will this net take place, “constant and unmodified by altered environment.” It is a type, therefore, of the inaptic class. On elaborating the experiment, we notice the same constant reaction to stimulus as before, but we find that the conditions of the animal to its environment will effect -the response of the brainless frog. A small piece of paper is moistened with glacial acetic acid and is applied to the skin on the inner side of the thigh; the leg on this side is at once violently drawn up, and the foot of the leg is swept over the spot where the irritation is so as to remove the paper. Now place the paper, moistened as before, on the side of the frog and hold the leg on the same side; at first, the frog will attempt to free this leg in order to remove the irritant; then, realising this is impossible, he struggles to remove it by means of the other leg, and after possibly several futile attempts, succeeds. Are these last two actions merely complications of the one first quoted; are they essentially the same, or can we name any fundamental distinction existing between them? The answer to this is highly controversial and varies according to the position taken up by the various writers. Ziehen, to whose work the reader is referred for a very able and lucid exposition of the opposing argument, takes up a position which, in the writer’s opinion, is altogether fallacious from his persistence in refusing to any nervous process the name or function of “psychical” unless it be accompanied with consciousness, a position which, however widely it may be held, appears to us to be founded on an altogether gratuitous and confusing assumption. In the case of the brainless frog, there can be no consciousness; there can “therefore,” be no “psychical “processes taking place, consequently all the phenomena are physical in nature; that part of the nervous system still intact can have no perception of altered conditions; still having no perception of altered conditions, it does alter its reactions. We are told that the actions are due simply to a complication of reflex processes. This “complication,” however, begs the question, for what we have to decide is the reason for these complications. No one will deny that the movements in the last experiment are more complicated than those in the first.
We must then discuss the reason of this complication, and in doing so, we must necessarily examine the position of the opposite school. To the question whether there can be any intermediate stage between the physical and the conscious states of the nervous system, Ziehen gives a decided answer. “All and only the phenomena which are imparted to our consciousness are psychical . . . The sensation of sight itself is psychical in so far as it affects our consciousness” ; and again: “Psychical: and ‘conscious’ are for us, at least, at the beginning of our investigations, identical.” Now, all this depends on the meaning that we attach to the word “psychical,” and let us say at once that, whilst all the higher psychical processes are necessarily part of a conscious process, yet the essential qualities of a psychical process do not, in our opinion, require the co-existence of consciousness. Any function which has to do with interpretation of impulses cannot be classed in the same category with a reaction of a merely physical nature, even though, as we are willing to admit, the interpretative function is equally a reaction to a stimulus; indeed, consciousness itself is such a reaction; but whilst in the case of the physical reaction we have nothing more than the simple unmodified reaction, in the case of the interpretative reaction we have a new element present, depending on the interposition of an agency quite foreign to the physical reaction. So obvious is this that Stirling, who describes the various experiments with the pithed frog, puts them under two heading& The simple withdrawal of the leg on pinching the toe he includes in the heading “Reflex Action”; whilst the removal of the irritant is placed under the significant heading “Chemical Stimulations-Purposive Characters of Reflex.” In a work dealing with the purely practical and experimental side of physiology this is somewhat curious, and the reference to the “purposive characters” would appear to indicate that in a greater or less degree the writer draws some distinction between the two classes of actions.
It might appear at first sight wiser to introduce an intermediate term and thus avoid the confusion caused by using the word “psychical” in a manner different from that of other writers. And since there is a real distinction existing between a conscious and, an unconscious act, we have referred the unconscious psychical process to the optic class. But in this class the psychical fea6ire is always present in a more or less elemental form, and consequently the term is common to the aptic and the conscious actions.
The actions comprised in the aptic class are so various that in the present state of our knowledge it is almost impossible to give an accurate definition which shall neither exclude too much nor include too little; yet in the case of a typical inaptic action of the first class and a typical aptic action there can be little difficulty in arriving at their classification. If we find an action. which must have required for its performance a perception of the present environment, an estimation, more or less complete, of the circumstances under which the action is to be performed, and a modification of the action to meet the existing conditions, then, since we cannot conceive the qualities of perception, estimation, and deduction as physical qualities, whilst on the other hand they definitely correspond with our conception of the immaterial nervous phenomena, we consequently can only classify them as psychical.
So prominent is the differentiation of these processes that the writers seeking refuge in “reflex action” have found it necessary to provide some way out. Ziehen quotes two experiments performed by Goltze, which well illustrate the difficulties under which the advocates of “reflex action” labour. “If after having removed the cerebrum of a frog we touch the cornea of the brainless animal with a couching-needle, the first reflex motion is the closing of its eyelid. If we repeat or intensify the stimulation the animal will strike the needle aside with the corresponding front foot. A still further increase causes the head and trunk to be turned away from the irritant. Finally, upon constantly increasing both the frequency and the intensity of the irritation the animal will retire to some other place.” Now if similar responses had taken place, say, in a healthy boy with an intact nervous system, could we class these as physical reactions? Yet in the case of the frog, because the cerebrum has been removed, we are to argue that there can be no consciousness; without consciousness there can be no psychical actions, and consequently the whole process is one corresponding with the simple physical reaction to a simple stimulus-the whole argument depending upon the fallacious identification of consciousness with psychical activity. Still even the erroneous limitation of “psychical” has to give way, and Ziehen in describing the next experiment takes refuge in the descriptive but question-begging term, “automatic acts or reactions.” A frog is taken and its cerebrum destroyed, leaving the optic thalamus intact. A prick on its foot easily causes it to leap off. “If we place an obstacle in the path of its retreat it avoids the obstruction, or, in rare cases, clears it with a well measured bound.” Whatever name we care to give to these processes they are essentially adaptive; they connote the elements of perception and deduction. As examples of psychical action without consciousness we can quote almost innumerable examples in ourselves. For instance, we may take the common instance of absent-mindedness, where the consciousness is fully occupied with an idea and cannot, in consequence, respond for some little time to another stimulus. Whilst in this absent-minded condition the person is addressed by a friend; at the time he gives no sign of having heard the remark; after an appreciable interval his consciousness is affected, and he replies. Between the time of the remark and the time of the reply, what has taken place? The stimuli afforded by the spoken words have been transmitted to the proper group; the exact nature of the stimuli has been appreciated; the memory has identified the words and supplied their meaning; all this must have happened at the moment, for the auditory stimulus could not well gain a reaction when the stimulus had ceased to exist; thus without any conscious process the stimulus has been received and appreciated; after a period of shorter or longer duration comes the action due to the conscious process, without which the reply could not be formulated. To quote other examples would be to Ell our pages with unnecessary material, since phenomena of a similar nature will readily occur to the reader- e.g., the playing of an instrument, the consciousness being engaged in some other direction; the performance of elaborate movements without any distinct consciousness of their performance, yet all of them dependent on some of the most psychical of combinations as the combination of perception, memory, and the like.
The views here put forward with regard to the nature of nervous action thus differ, in material particulars, from any of the current theories. Now we may briefly summarise the distinctions. The views depending upon the assumption of an “entity” inhabiting the body, and commonly called-the “soul,” must be at once dismissed, since, in their origin and advocacy, they do not depend on scientific investigation; the argument as to the necessity of a “soul” for the production of thought is equally applicable as an argument for the existence of a “soul” controlling and supervising the processes of gastric digestion; moreover, it is only as we have been able to rid ourselves of this and similar superstitions that any progress has been made in the study of the mental processes.
The only method by which we can arrive at a sure knowledge of the aetiology and physiology of nervous action is by a study of the organ to which this function belongs. We thus rely entirely on the psychology which is physiological in its arguments and methods; when, however, we come to examine the details of the processes in this manner we are bound to differ from many of the writers on physiological psychology in matters of moment, though, at the same time, we would acknowledge the great and lasting value of their work. And the first point on which we join issue is in their method of regarding and treating what they term “Reflex action.” The use of the term is to express the constant reaction to a stimulus; to the same stimulus there will be the same reaction. The experiment may be repeated a hundred times and the same result will be obtained. Therefore, because of this constant reaction to a constant stimulus, the simple actions, such as the one above referred to, are classed as “reflex.” But such a limitation is altogether artificial and confusing; so far from such a reaction being limited to the simple movements, the law of a constant reaction to a constant stimulus applies with equal force to the highest cerebral functions. When we see a friend-can we help seeing him? Why, because the response to the stimulus is in a conscious process, should we exclude it from the class of reflex actions? The stimulus is present, the reaction to the stimulus is present, and the relation is constant. When we hear a piano-organ, we recognise the sounds and their origin, though we do not see the instrument or the player, and we cannot help recognising them, we find it impossible to avoid the effects they produce on us. The higher cerebral processes, it is true, are much more complicated; each state of consciousness is modified by stimuli belonging to the present environment, which can probably never be repeated in their exact order, number, and rotation; but each separate stimulus produces its separate response, and for every one that we can isolate we can obtain the same evidence of a constant response to a constant stimulus. Therefore, not some, not many, but all nervous actions are “reflex” actions. If, however, we thus include all the nervous processes within this term, it must lose all its value as a classificatory term for certain of the elementary functions, and this is the reason for its avoidance, in our suggested classification. Thus with regard to the etiology of the phenomena, our position is simple; whether or no the action corresponds to any one of Ziehen’s three classes {(1) Motions constant and generally following; results from one or more external stimuli-no psychical correlative. (2) Motion modified by one or more intercurrent stimuli; generally following no psychical correlative. (3) Motion results directly or indirectly from one or more external stimuli; modified by the association of intercurrent sensations and ideas; generally following-with psychical correlative} they all obey the same law of constancy; the precise response depending on the part stimulated, the paths through which the stimulus passes, and the_ point at which it terminates.
In the preceding, therefore, we have sought to classify the actions, not according to their ultimate etiology, which is essentially the same in all, but according to the nature of the processes involved in the response made to the stimulus.
If the response be one which is giving no evidence of modification due to the external environment, we include it in the elementary class of nervous action-the inaptic. If the response be of such a nature as to show that there has been a modification due to the environment of the moment, but without consciousness, then we have an easily appreciable distinction as our basis for a second classification--the aptic. Finally, if the response be associated with a conscious process, we again have a real and definite distinction upon which to rely for the third and last class.
But the student will readily perceive that our distinction between the first and second classes, whilst definite enough in many marked cases, is certainly vague in others. Indeed, we admit at once that taking all the actions belonging to cases 1 and 2 together, it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to definitely relegate some actions to either. class; there would remain a certain percentage of indeterminate phenomena. Admitting this, we cannot pretend that the classification is a perfect one. Still further, when we consider the terms “unmodified by reason of adaptation to altered environment” we may meet with the criticism that in the simplest cases we cannot materially alter the environment so as to affect the response, without at the same time altering the stimulus. Again, perhaps we should regard the simple “reflexes” as adaptive; unquestionably they are of service to the organism; the loss of the “corneal reflex” may and often does result in serious injury to the eye; the withdrawal of the frog’s foot on pinching it may also be considered as adaptive; but all this is probably developmental in its origin and can be so explained; then there are many “reflexes” of no use to the organism, though equally of developmental origin, as for example, the gluteal, cremasteric, abdominal, epigastric and scapular” reflexes.” So far, therefore, as this class of actions is adaptive or “fitting,” they are so from developmental consideration, and not from any spontaneous recognition of and adaptation to the present environment; whereas a typical aptic action is characterised by the recognition of circumstances which require to be taken into account. For our purpose it matters little as to the exact point at which we may deny or admit the interposition of an unconscious intelligence, so long as we recognise that amongst the functions of the nervous system one of the most important parts is played by this unconscious intelligence. So much in observation and experiment is conclusive in this direction that we make little apology for the intrusion of the term-unconscious psychical action.
So far, we have relied mainly on experiments conducted on animals; but if we are to pursue our studies in direct application to human psychology it is above all things necessary that we should experiment on the human subject. And in this direction the most promising field is in the study of the hypnotic state; for here we have a condition which is a remarkable deviation from the normal condition, yet in which every action performed in normal life can equally be performed. Psychologists have profited but little from the opportunities open to them for various reasons; the experimental use of hypnotism requires a good deal of practical experience and a precise knowledge of the condition; physiologists being, as a body, devoid of this practical experience, have put forward theories which are evidently the results of casual and inexact observation, and not infrequently appear to be founded on their knowledge of the normal nervous processes rather than on any actual knowledge of the hypnotic state.’ Having dealt in as brief a manner as possible with the structure and function of the nervous system, regarded as a whole, we shall now turn our attention to the modifications effected by the induction of hypnosis, with especial reference to the physiology of . the .modifications thus induced. The phenomena of hypnosis we discuss separately, and we shall only refer in this instance to such of the phenomena as may be necessary to the course, of the argument.
The attention of physicians and. physiologists has been directed towards what is termed the influence of the “Mind” upon the “Body,” and in numerous works We find references to the effects of “suggestion” in the waking state; still further, we recognise the effects of emotions on the normal process, the effect, for instance, of fear in preventing the flow of saliva; the effect of nervous emotion on the gastro-intestinal tract, and many others. In a vague and unsatisfactory way these are classed as examples of a condition in the body sympathetic with that in the mind. These theories involve a misconception of which it is difficult to get rid.
In our description of the anatomy and distribution of the nervous system no reference was made to any distribution of neurons or fibres whose function, pure and simple, was mental. So far as our anatomical and histological knowledge of the nervoussystem goes, we can point to no group which does not either receive sensory impulses or from which motor impulses do not emanate. Indeed, if from anatomical considerations we were to attempt a localisation of the mind, we should rather place it in the arborescing dendrons than in-any other situation. But so far from seeking to attempt any such localisation of the mental functions it will be seen that we have every reason to believe that there is no such separation physiologically considered. Thus the neuron which receives the sensory stimulus, the neuron which discharges the motor impulse, and the arborescence connecting the two, are also psychical in function, either separately or as a group. This conclusion is not derived from that fruitful source of error, introspection, but partly from a consideration of the structure of the nervous system, partly from a consideration of the normal nervous phenomena, but chiefly from the writer’s study and observation of the hypnotic phenomena. If there be any reason for the opinion above expressed, the importance of a knowledge of nervous-anatomy will be easily realised, and it will be essential to bear in mind the anatomical and physiological details referred to in the earlier parts of this chapter.
The group of neurons must then be regarded as an organic unit capable of sensation, ideation, emotion, volition, and motion, in other words, capable of psychical and physical activity. With this group ‘some others are in arborescent connection. We have at once on this conception a clearer view of the phenomena of the nervous system; emotion betrays itself in muscular movement, as movement betrays itself in emotion; the psychical actions of the organism correspond with the physical, and the physical actions with the psychical actions of the organism, not because the one acts on the other, not, therefore, because of the influence of the “Mind” on the “Body,” but because the processes are the results of the neuronic groups in action.’
Here, however, we must indicate the limitations which govern the action of the group, for, though well acquainted with the muscular element of consciousness we are equally familiar with the idea, the reflection or thought which causes no appreciable physical reaction, and with the movement which is unassociated with a conscious process; for the laws of inhibition apply with equal force to the nervous system itself, and the following examples illustrate this. In the case of a severe fright the stimuli are so strong, and produce such a violent reaction, that the ordinary inhibitory forces are not strong enough to meet the case; the inhibitory power is withdrawn from the general system and centralised upon the higher cerebral groups; concomitantly with this withdrawal of inhibition, the heart, no longer restrained by the retarding inhibitory influences passing down the vagus, beats more rapidly and more strongly, and we have the “thumping” heart as a consequence of this withdrawal. Again, in the case of diseases causing an atrophy of the nervous tracts leading from the brain, and consequently causing a shutting-off of the inhibition, the “reflex” actions are increased, and others are developed, which in the normal subject are not present?
In the case of the neuronic group we have a twofold phase of inhibition: the physical and the unconscious psychical are restrained within their paths, so that with normal stimuli their reactions will correspond completely to the stimulus; the energy represented by the stimulus will have entirely disappeared in the Unconscious sphere, and there will be in consequence no disturbance of the conscious elements of the group. Should, however, the stimulus be too strong to be dissipated in this manner, then the consciousness will be affected according to the degree of excess in the stimulus in this manner we may have, (1), a stiinulus causing action belonging to either the first or the second class of nervous actions. (2), A stimulus, which, being in excess, is dissipated in an affection of the consciousness. (3), A violent stimulus, the excess of which is so great as to affect the consciousness violently. (4), A stimulus which tends to affect the consciousness first, and does not directly cause physical or unconscious psychical reaction, unless in excess (e.g., special sensation). In this manner we might easily multiply the possible varieties, thus two stimuli may be combined, as for instance, (1) and (4), and the consciousness is affected by the sensation of touch, whilst the other actions are accompanied by no conscious process.
We have, therefore, a very delicate mechanism kept in adjustment by inhibition; in the normal state, subject to withdrawal and increase of the inhibitory impulses, and with momentary variations in the balance between the processes attended and those unattended with consciousness. In the nervously irritable we have a condition of weak inhibitory power, with the result that normal stimuli produce abnormal reactions; the balance may be altered by means of drugs, such as alcohol, cannabis indica, and in various conditions such as sleep, coma, etc., so that we are well acquainted with conditions in which the normal balance is more or less interfered with. The interference may be quite within physiological bounds, or, in its nature and degree, may become a pathological condition. From a consideration of the phenomena we shall be easily able to deduce the purely physiological nature of the modifications induced in normal hypnosis.
In the account of the phenomena of hypnosis in au earlier chapter, stress was laid on the change which occurs in the hypnotised subject apart from the effects of suggestion. The changes in the pulse and respiration are comparatively trivial, since they may occur in many normal conditions, but the altered condition of .the consciousness is exeedingly important. The disappearance of normal irritability, the acute passivity, and the lack of attention to the external on the part of the subject, are all evidences of a profound change in the nervous system. This alteration is spontaneous; it has not been caused by the action of drugs or by increasing or decreasing the metabolism of any particular portion of the nervous system, but has resulted from a cerebral change produced as a result of the various stimuli brought into action in inducing hypnosis.
All this has been brought about as a consequence of the abnormal form of inhibition induced, which tends to limit the action of other higher psychical functions to the least degree possible, and this is still true, even in the case of hallucinations and the effects of other suggestions which might appear to be due to an increased ideation.
Most of the theories propounded in explanation of the phenomena of hypnosis have been put forward by physiologists who, however eminent in the branch of science which they have studied, have apparently not had opportunity of systematically observing the hypnotic phenomena. The commonest and the most improbable is the theory which assumes a psychical exaggeration; the subject is “preoccupied” with the idea given to him by the suggestion; so increased are Ms powers of ideation that the developments of the idea are manifested in every direction; he is told he sees till he-believes he really does, and so forth. This theory, put forward in many ways and with various modifications, is, in the writer’s opinion, untenable. Whatever may be the cause of the hypnotic phenomena, we are assured that any explanation proceeding on these lines is wide of the mark. The symptoms in hypnosis when accurately studied point in quite the opposite direction. If we say to a person in the normal condition, “Your left arm is stiff; you cannot bend or move it,” we may cause amusement or surprise in the individual, but the arm is as capable of movement as before, and remains in every way normal. If, on the contrary, we make such a suggestion to a person in a moderately deep hypnosis, the effect is markedly different; there is no evidence of surprise or any other emotion on the part of the subject; he does not reply, and from the appearance of his features he does not appear to have heard the remark; as far as his general appearance gives us any information, his consciousness has not been affected by the words spoken; but, on the other hand, the arm is affected; it is quite stiff, immovable by any muscular contractions of the subject’s muscles, and only with great difficulty to be moved by another person.
So far, then, as the higher cerebral functions are concerned, the excess is all in the normal person; it is the physical reaction which is here distinctive of hypnosis.
Having previously demonstrated the play of inhibition in the psychical as well as in the physical functions of the brain, we are now in a position to represent physiologically the differences in the course of the suggestions in the two cases. Taking the case of the suggestion of stiffness of the arm made to the normal person, the distribution may be represented as in the diagram (Fig. 12); the stimulus is dissipated in the formation of ideas connected with the suggestion, and it is, therefore, the conscious function of the neuronic group which acts in response to the stimulus. In the case of the suggestion made to the hypnotised subject, there is no ideation; the subject does not consider the possible truth or untruth of the suggestion its reasonableness, or the reverse; for those, functions are inhibited. Those paths being thus shut off, the stimulus must be dissipated in the other functions of the neuronic group, and these are the physical.
Yet the inhibition of the conscious process is not complete; for obviously before the motor effect can be produced the meaning of the suggestion must be appreciated; but this is an attendant process, unassociated with the development of ideation. In the same way the inhibition, in the normal state, of the motor functions is not complete; for associated with the consciousness and ideation caused by the suggestion, is the motor part of the emotion of surprise, etc., with which the suggestion was received.
The principles here enunciated enable us to gain a more thorough appreciation of the processes employed in the execution of suggestions which are psychical in their nature. It may appear difficult to apply our theory to these conditions, which are especially characterised by the action of the higher groups, such as those employed in hallucinations, illusions, etc.; especially may this appear to be the case when we have to do with increased sensory powers. But when we realise the limitations which surround the exhibition of these phenomena, we shall find that they present no difficulty, and that in many points they lend a striking confirmation to the views here expressed.
One of the most noteworthy features in a posthypnotic hallucination is the completeness with which it possesses the individual. If we take an ordinary uneducated boy, and suggest to him that when he wakes up he will find himself a certain eminent actor, we notice that he takes to the part with a readiness which appears astonishing. Not that his powers of elocution or acting are, in themselves, increased; but all the influences which would restrain him were he “acting” are absent. There is no self-consciousness; no consideration as to whether he is interesting his audience; all his ideas are turned in the direction of the idea which has been suggested to him Moreover, it is not concerned with any volitional energy on his part; he would be amazed at the person who told him he was not the actor in question. He would be in the same frame of mind as we should be were we told that we were not ourselves. The reason of his condition is as follows. We have already explained that in the appreciation of the suggestion the consciousness of the hypnotic subject is not interfered with, so that we have a full and free play of the subject’s ideation and emotion with reference to the suggestion which is their stimulus; but there is still, not only in theory, but, as we have seen, in fact, a marked limitation to the action of his consciousness with reference to the suggestion in directions other than that indicated by the suggestion. Coincident with the inhibition of one set of functions, there is an increased capability of action in the others; the result we may represent almost mathematically. The stimulus, instead of being dissipated amongst an indefinite number of neuronic groups, or parts of groups, is confined to those whose function is the pure appreciation of the stimulus; the other groups whose function is the consideration of the reasonableness of the suggestion and the development of the-stimulus in other conscious directions are inhibited. Let us represent the stimulus by 5; in the hypnotic state, the 5 is confined to, and therefore being dissipated in, one department of conscious activity. In the normal state the 5 is dissipated in various directions, and assuming that there are at least twice,as many neuronic groups in conscious action as there are in hypnosis, we, may safely divide the 5 by 2 to represent the share of any one function; but, further, the other 2-1/2 would be dissipated not in assisting the execution of the suggestion, but in its consideration, and, consequently, in the retardation and prevention of any execution. Hence, taking this as an example, in hypnosis we have a force represented by 5 acting unrestrained; in normal conditions, with the same stimulus, there is a force of 2-1/2 opposed by a force of 2-1/2 .
Many problems of great interest are suggested by the careful examination of the phenomena of hallucinations and illusions belonging to the deeper states; moreover, the probability that the function of memory. essentially belongs to the neuronic group connected with the action, and the reasons for this unity of function are clearly brought out in many experiments; but we do not propose to deal at length with the phenomena of hallucination, for while their etiology differs in no wise from the other premises of hypnosis, many other considerations would have to be brought forward which would involve us in a psychological discussion impossible to keep within our limits. But some of the questions may be briefly illustrated. In the experiments where an educated subject was led to spell incorrectly there was distinct evidence of a conflict between other suggested ignorance of the subject and his actual knowledge. The action of the neuronic group under these suggestions presents some curious problems. Did the subject, for instance, think at the time that “hundrud” was the correct spelling; or did he write it so because he was suggestively conscious that” hundred” was wrong? It was noticeable that before omitting the letter “a” or committing an error of spelling, there was a momentary but distinct hesitation. The spelling in the specimen reproduced is nearly, though not quite, phonetic, and it is difficult to say whether the suggestion simply had the effect of causing the subject to -spell phonetically or whether a more elaborate process was induced. The latter hypothesis appears to be the more probable, and in all cases it would seem that there is a distinct knowledge in the subject’s mind of the right form, which, however, is so suddenly and automatically modified, by the action of the suggestion, that he is never conscious of the modification. This kind of ignorance is present to some extent in the normal state; we are not actively conscious of the separate effects produced by the rays from any object striking the eye; we are only aware of the final result, i.e., we see the object.
There is a moment in all hypnotic illusions when, though the subject knows it not, the brain recognises the truth. If we suggest to a subject that when he sees the letter “a” he shall think it is “b,” it is obvious that he must perceive and recognise “a” before he can confuse it with “b.” The complexity of the process instituted by any suggestion of this kind is evident when we consider that not only does the apparatus of vision act in the normal manner, but the perception must first act normally before the suggestion can take effect, and when the suggestion has taken effect, the impression remains a psychical one and does not affect the retina of the optic nerve.
It is clear, from the final result of the suggestion, that the psychical impression at once interprets the stimulus of objective reality, according to the original cerebral stimulus supplied by the suggestion. There is present, that is to say, as a result, a condition of the cerebral cells which will accurately adapt the action to the combined effect of the suggestion and the objective stimulus. This was well illustrated in the following experiment: It was suggested to a subject in hypnosis that at a certain time (about a week later) and at a certain place, he should find that T-- was V-- and that V-- was T--. During the interval there was no confusion in his mind as to their respective personalities; but, at the time and place suggested, coming up to V--, he asked him if he knew where V-- was, and, on seeing T-- just entering the ball, went towards him saying, “Ah, there he is”. For the next hour, which was the limit given in the suggestion, it was impossible to disabuse him of the idea; at the expiration of the hour he looked somewhat absorbed in himself and puzzled for a few moments, and then continued his conversation; only, he no longer confused the two persons, and, when challenged with what he had previously been doing, he stoutly denied that he had done anything of the kind. Another experiment of a similar nature may be mentioned. L-- and M-- are intimate friends. It was suggested, in hypnosis, to L-- that M was V-- and that V-- was M--. This suggestion was made at 11.30 a.m. and continued entirely effective until 2.30 p.m., when L-- was hypnotised again and the impression was removed. The three went for a walk, lunched together, played billiards, etc., L-- confusing M-- and V-- the whole time. In this case L-- remembered afterwards all that had occurred, but still retained the impression that what M-- had done was
V—‘s doing, and vice versa,. Thus, V-- played billiards with him whilst M--marked; but he said (after the removal of the suggestion) that it was M-- who played with him and that it was V-- who marked, and so forth. These two cases are examples of two distinct post-hypnotic states; in neither case was the subject open to further suggestion. The action of the memoric faculty, in its twofold aspect of the preservation and the reproduction of ideas, is vividly illustrated by some of the phenomena of hypnosis. The observed facts seem to support the view that no impression is ever absolutely effaced from the brain; the faculty of recalling an idea (recollection) may be absent, but the cerebral record is permanent. The two cases quoted above [Parrot and the girl, etc] seem to be hardly capable of explanation on any other hypothesis. The phenomena of memory as seen in the dreaming, sleep-walking, and hypnotic states all point to this conclusion. The faculty of recalling these impressions is, however, generally non-existent when the brain is in a different condition from that in which the impression was made. The recollection of an idea depends upon the ability of the brain to link together its various impressions until it gains a connected whole, of which the part recollected is an essential feature. If, then, by some cerebral modification there be a distinct break in the chain no recollection will be possible. Accordingly there must be some connection between that recollected and the moment of recollection; the link may be supplied in many ways, but if the physiological modification be great so will the difficulty of recollection be correspondingly great. If, therefore, there be a profound physiological change, such as occurs in hypnosis, the probability is that recollection will not be present until that physiological condition is reproduced.. This law is adequately illustrated by the phenomena of hypnosis, to which we have referred in the previous chapter. Moreover, our general knowledge of the memory is brought to a more definite state by considerations resulting from our knowledge of the condition underlying the relations between the physical and psychical action of the nervous system; we may assume that each neuronic group possesses the memory of the stimuli which it has received, and that there is a necessary sensation-memory and motor-memory intimately associated with the recognition of stimuli and with the discharge of the proper motor impulses.
We have attempted in this rapid introduction to the subject of the physiology of hypnosis to place before the student an argument as to its etiology and its relationships with the normal conditions derived almost entirely from observation and experiment. That in so complex a subject we should have adequately considered each phenomenon of importance is not possible, but we have endeavoured to select various examples typical of their kinds and thus illustrate the general principles underlying the nervous adaptation in hypnosis. No doubt we may still be told that the mental processes, and specially those occurring in hypnosis, are so many puzzles interesting though never soluble; but to the student properly acquainted with his subject there is no mystery in hypnosis. Our knowledge is far from complete, but it is only when there is a great. deal known about a subject that the incompleteness of our knowledge becomes evident. In hypnosis itself there is nothing mysterious or insoluble; the uncertain elements in it belong to it in common with all those processes connected with the immaterial and imponderable reaction to stimuli. At least we may comprehend the fact that thought is ultimately as much a physical fact as the process of secretion in a gland or the beating of the heart, and that these functions are necessarily associated with one another, not by reason of any impression from the “Mind,” but in an exact quantitative relationship. Given the definite stimulus, it may result in high psychical activities and give rise to a thought; with the conscious function debarred from action the stimulus is expressed in other than conscious terms; it is in hypnosis that we can regulate the course of the stimulus and determine its reaction.
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